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WILLIAM BAUDE
PRECEDENT AND DISCRETION
Supreme Court precedent is a topic of perennial prominence. The
Court overruled or severely limitedmultiple precedents last year, just
as it did the year before that. Because of our widely repeated norm of
stare decisis, every overruling is criticized. Scholars have then de-
bated whether the Court needs a stronger norm of stare decisis, so
that it overrules fewer cases.1
This focus is misguided. Rather than worrying about which cases
will be cast aside, we should pay more attention to those precedents
that are left standing in place. Many of the Court’s questionable
precedents nonetheless go unquestioned. The real problem is not
that the Court overrules too much, but that it overrules without a
theory that explains why it overrules so little.
At last, it seems such theories may be coming. Last Term, Justice
Thomas (in Gamble v United States)2 and Justice Alito (in Gundy v
United States)3 each attempted to explain some of their decisions to
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reject and adhere to precedent. These explanations deserve serious
scholarly scrutiny, which they have not yet received.
Unfortunately, these interventions do not solve, and indeed they
exacerbate, the problem. What they propose is neither a regime of
adherence to precedent, nor a regime without precedent, but rather
a regime in which individual Justices have substantial discretion
whether to adhere to precedent or not. This turns precedent from a
tool to constrain discretion into a tool to expand discretion, and ul-
timately into a tool to evade more fundamental legal principles.
Part I describes the state of stare decisis in the Court today. Part II
discusses Justice Thomas’s theory that precedent must be overruled
when it is “demonstrably erroneous.” Part III describes Justice Alito’s
theory that precedents ought not be overruled on the basis of “halfway
originalism.” Part IV explains why discretionary precedent—of which
these theories are examples—is worse than no precedent at all.
I. Precedent in the New Roberts Court
The Supreme Court’s commitment to precedent has become
a central topic of both legal theory and legal politics. This develop-
ment is predictable when the working majority of the Court changes,
because of the mismatch between the cases that have been decided in
the past and the way the same Justices would decide them today.
During the last two Supreme Court nomination hearings, prece-
dent was cast in a starring role. Now-Justice Gorsuch repeatedly
answered questions about past cases by promising to analyze them
under the “law of precedent”4 and reminded the Senators that he had
coauthored an “excellent doorstop”5 of a book on that topic. Now-
Justice Kavanaugh (also a coauthor of that doorstop) went further,
arguing to the Senators that “the system of precedent comes from
Article III itself.”6
Last Term put those commitments to the test. The Court had four
cases that directly confronted the question of whether to overrule
4 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 115th Cong, 1st Sess 74–76, 135 (2017).
5 Id at 74. See also id at 135 (“great doorstop”). See generally Bryan A. Garner, ed, The Law
of Judicial Precedent (West, 2016).
6 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an As-
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 115th Cong, 2nd Sess 226 (2018)
(Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing). See also id at 149, 157, 503–04.
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past SupremeCourt cases, as well as twomore in which theCourt was
asked to formally limit or narrow7 a precedent:
InKnick v Township of Scott,8 theCourt overruledWilliamson County
Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank,9 making it easier to
bring federal takings claims. And in Franchise Tax Board of California v
Hyatt,10 the Court overruled Nevada v Hall,11 making it possible for
states to demand sovereign immunity in other states’ courts.
Meanwhile, inGamble v United States,12 the Court declined to over-
rule three cases establishing a “dual sovereignty exception” to the
principle of double jeopardy.13 And in Kisor v Wilkie,14 the Court de-
clined to overrule two cases requiring deference to agency interpre-
tations of ambiguous regulations,15 albeit with some warnings about
the narrow scope of those cases.
Additionally, in American Legion v American Humanist Association,16
the Court expressly disavowed the applicability of a prior Establish-
ment Clause precedent—Lemon v Kurtzman17—to “longstanding
monuments, symbols, and practices.”18 And in Herrera v Wyoming,19
the Court wrote of its precedent inWard v Race Horse20 that while the
case had not been “expressly overruled” it was nonetheless “repudi-
ated” in its reasoning.21
7 See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum L Rev
1861 (2015).
8 139 S Ct 2162 (2019).
9 473 US 172 (1985).
10 139 S Ct 1485 (2019).
11 440 US 410 (1979).
12 139 S Ct 1960 (2019).
13 See, for example, United States v Lanza, 260 US 377 (1922); Abbate v United States, 359
US 187 (1959); Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121 (1959).
14 139 S Ct 2400 (2019).
15 See Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997); Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 US 410
(1945).
16 139 S Ct 2067 (2019).
17 403 US 602 (1971).
18 American Legion, 139 S Ct at 2081–82 (plurality). Justice Thomas voiced his express
agreement with this part of the plurality opinion and noted that he would “take the logical
next step and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.” Id at 2097 (Thomas, J, concurring in
the judgment).
19 139 S Ct 1686 (2019).
20 163 US 504 (1896).
21 Herrera, 139 S Ct at 1697.
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The obvious accusation is that the Roberts Court is poised to cut a
swath through any precedent that a five-Justice majority believes to
be incorrect—a warning sounded in dissents by both Justice Breyer
and Justice Kagan,22 in cynical echo of Justice Brennan’s saying that
“with five votes, you could accomplish anything.”23 This complaint
has been echoed in much commentary about the Court as well.24
But things are not so simple. Nobody on the Court believes in
absolute stare decisis.25 Nobody thinks it was wrong for the Court to
overturn, say, Plessy v Ferguson 26 during the 1950s. Moreover, the
most systematic reviews of Supreme Court overruling suggest that
there is no increasing trend: the Roberts Court overrules precedent
less often than the Rehnquist, Burger, or Warren Courts.27
This leads us to the more important concern. Compared to the
small number of Supreme Court decisions that have been overruled,
what about the many precedents that the same Justices have not over-
ruled, and often refused to even consider whether to overrule? The
Court’s decisions to stand by precedent are far more common, and
often less justified, than its decisions to overrule. For instance:
In 2018 the Supreme Court decided Janus v AFSCME,28 over-
turning part of its prior decision inAbood v Detroit Board of Education,29
22 Knick, 139 S Ct at 2190 (Kagan, J, dissenting); Franchise Tax Board, 139 S Ct at 1506
(Breyer, J, dissenting).
23 Seth Stern and Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 196 (Houghton
Mifflin, 2010). But for an ambiguity here, see Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Bi-
ographies, 70 NYU L Rev 748, 763 (1995) (“Some clerks understood Brennan to mean that it
takes five votes to do anything, others that with five votes you could do anything”).
24 See, for example, Charles Fried, Not Conservative, Harv L Rev Blog ( July 3, 2018), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/G568-Y5LU; The Activist Roberts Court, 10 Years In, New York
Times ( July 4, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/M64X-YZ86; Erwin Chemerinsky, Does
Precedent Matter to Conservative Justices on the Roberts Court?, ABA J ( June 27, 2019), archived
at https://perma.cc/F3TM-7F9X.
25 Justice Kagan, who voted to uphold precedent in five of the six cases, still voted to re-
pudiate Race Horse in Herrera. At the other extreme, Justice Gorsuch voted against precedent
in all six cases.
26 163US 537 (1896), overruled at least as to education by Brown v Board of Education, 347US
483, 494–95 (1954 ), and then rejected as to transportation in Gayle v Browder, 352 US 903
(1956).
27 See Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision (Government Printing Of-
fice, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/V6YJ-TEP5; Jonathan Adler, The Stare Decisis Court,
Reason: The Volokh Conspiracy ( July 18, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3A2P-D437;
Brandon J. Murrill, The Supreme Court’s Overruling of Constitutional Precedent, Congressional
Research Service (Sept 24, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/TM8N-YFYV.
28 138 S Ct 2448 (2018).
29 431 US 209 (1977).
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and rendering mandatory contributions to public sector unions un-
constitutional. But the Court did not seriously question the other half
of its decision in Abood—the half that was actually wrong—which had
subjected such contributions to First Amendment scrutiny in the first
place.30
In its 2019 decision in Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court
overturned its precedent inNevada v Hall, despite plausible arguments
for retaining the decision. But the Court did not revisit several juris-
dictional precedents thatwere farmore clearly erroneous.31 Indeed, the
Court didn’t even mention the problem, even though those issues
were jurisdictional.
In case after case, the Court has applied the doctrine of qualified
immunity to protect officers from liability for their unconstitutional
actions. It has done so despite a civil rights statute that explicitly creates
official liability, and despite the lack of a valid legal source for the
judge-crafted doctrine.32 Even as various Justices have expressed mis-
givings about the doctrine,33 all of them have continued to apply it and
the Court has declined to revisit it.
And of course similar examples abound. Adherence to precedent is
still the rule, not the exception, in nearly every case before the Court.
The real problem with the Supreme Court’s decisions to overrule
precedent is not how much, but when. The Court does not consis-
tently adhere to its precedents, but it does not consistently revisit
them either.
TheCourt’s own cases do invoke reasons when they decide whether
prior cases should be overruled. But there are competing sets of rea-
sons, laid down in highly controversial cases,34 and they leave plenty
of discretion in the hands of the Court, as evidenced from its re-
cent disagreements. That 800-page doorstop coauthored by Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh contains little guidance on the seemingly
30 See William Baude and Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132
Harv L Rev 171, 180–89 (2018).
31 See William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, The Misunderstood Eleventh Amendment (Oc-
tober 8, 2019) 14–15, 17–20, 40–46, online at https://ssrn.com/abstractp3466298.
32 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal L Rev 45, 77 (2018).
33 See Ziglar v Abbasi, 137 S Ct 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Kisela v Hughes, 138 S Ct 1148, 1161 (2018) (Sotomayor, J,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J).
34 Compare Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 828–30 (1991), with Planned Parenthood of
Southeast Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 854–61 (1992), and Citizens United v Federal
Election Commission, 558 US 310, 362–65 (2010).
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central question of when the Supreme Court should overturn its own
case law.35 In the last volume of this review, Professor Frederick
Schauer concluded that stare decisis doctrine is so “tissue-thin” that it
has little or no constraining effect on the Court.36
In principle, the Court could perhaps transcend this disagreement if
there were at least agreement on a valid legal source of precedent, suf-
ficiently determinate that it could derive rules to govern the Court’s
practice. But that determinate source has not materialized either. So it
appears that the Justices do not in fact acknowledge a law of precedent,
and maybe not even a “semblance of law” to use in law’s stead.37
This lack of doctrine was on display last Term. No Justice was in
the majority in all six of the Court’s confrontations with precedent.
All of the Justices, for instance, who were in the majority in Knick and
Franchise Tax Board refused to join Herrera or Kisor or both. This is
partly a consequence of a multimember Court; even if the Justices are
individually consistent, the institution as a whole inevitably will not
be.38 It also suggests the lack of any shared account of stare decisis.39
Even if the Court as an institution is inconsistent, we might still
hope for individual Justices to be consistent.40 What made last Term
somewhat hopeful was that oral arguments revealed that some of the
Justices finally seemed to recognize the need for a transsubstantive,
content-independent account of stare decisis. Schauer pointed out
that a doctrine of stare decisis is only rhetoric unless it operates to
protect some decisions that you dislike;41 Justice Kagan started in-
voking the doctrine in criminal procedure cases where we might at
least imagine she disagrees with the precedents.42 Across multiple
35 Garner, Judicial Precedent at 396–409 (cited in note 5) (describing competing “Reasons
For Overruling” and “Reasons Against Overruling”).
36 Schauer, Stare Decisis, 2018 Supreme Court Rev at 132, 135, 137–30 (cited in note 1). See
also Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 40 Am J Pol Sci 971 (1996).
37 See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Precedent and the Semblance of Law, 33 Const Comm 417
(2018).
38 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802, 812 (1982).
39 See id at 818 n 39 (“Stare decisis is applied so loosely that it seems fair to say that it does
not exist as a doctrine”).
40 Id at 832 (“There is no reason why we cannot ask each Justice to develop a principled
jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently”).
41 Schauer, 2018 Supreme Court Review at 128 (cited in note 1).
42 See Oral Argument, Gamble v United States, No 17-647, ∗20, 38–40 (Dec 6, 2018); Oral
Argument, Ramos v Louisiana, No 18-5924, ∗21–22, 29–30, 37–39, 49–50 (Oct 7, 2019).
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cases Justice Kavanaugh began to float a theory that stare decisis
was binding unless a prior decision was either “grievously” or “egre-
giously” wrong, plus several other factors.43 But in the end, neither of
these Justices provided a theory of precedent in writing.
Two other Justices, however, did provide an account of how they
would confront precedent. Justice Thomas did so in an extended
concurrence in Gamble v United States, maintaining that he was for-
bidden to follow precedent in any case where it was “demonstrably
erroneous.”44 Justice Alito did so in a much shorter concurrence in
Gundy v United States,45 which seemed to echo a passage in his pre-
vious opinion in Janus decrying “halfway originalism.”46
These accounts deserve further scrutiny. They confront serious
problems about the role of precedent in the Supreme Court. Indeed,
they deserve plaudits for addressing overarching theories of prece-
dent at all. And they each provide accounts that may initially seem
startling, but are plausible upon closer inspection.
Nonetheless, despite the credit they deserve, both of these ac-
counts of precedent ultimately share a disconcerting feature: they end
up giving the Justices an important degree of discretion in deciding
whether to adhere to an erroneous precedent. That discretion, as I
will eventually explain, mutates precedent into the opposite of what it
should be.
II. Justice Thomas and the Demonstrable Error
Justice Thomas’s separate opinion on precedent arrived as a
concurrence to the Court’s decision in Gamble, which decided to re-
tain the “dual sovereignty exception” to the doctrine of double jeop-
ardy. The merits of the case are of only tangential relevance here.
The dual sovereignty exception permits a defendant to be placed into
jeopardy twice for the same offense, so long as it is by two different
sovereign governments (such as a state and the federal government).
Prior opinions by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, as well as a pile of
43 See Oral Argument, Franchise Tax Board v Hyatt, No 17-1299, ∗53–54 ( Jan 9, 2019);
Oral Argument, Gamble v United States, No 17-647, ∗41–42 (Dec 6, 2018).
44 Gamble, 139 S Ct at 1981 (Thomas, J, concurring); see Part II.
45 139 S Ct 2116 (2019).
46 Id at 2131 (Alito, J, concurring); Janus, 138 S Ct at 2470. See Part III.
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learned research, had called the doctrine into question, especially on
originalist grounds.47
In Gamble, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
doctrine should be overruled, and it might have seemed that to agree
to ask the question was to foreshadow the answer. But in a 7–2 de-
cision, the Court ultimately decided to retain the doctrine, conclud-
ing that the historical evidence against the doctrine was too “feeble”
to outweigh other arguments including the Court’s many prece-
dents.48 One of those seven was Justice Thomas, who wrote that “the
historical record does not bear out my initial skepticism of the dual-
sovereignty doctrine.”49
Even though his view of stare decisis was no longer relevant to the
case, Justice Thomas decided to write at length “to address the proper
role of the doctrine of stare decisis,” a doctrine which he believed had
gone astray from the Court’s “judicial duty under Article III.”50 Chan-
neling academic arguments thatmight once have seemed fringe, Justice
Thomas argued that judges have an obligation—not just a power, but
a duty—to disregard and overrule any precedent that is “demonstrably
erroneous.”51
This opinion provided a serious intellectual framework for Justice
Thomas’s long-standing skepticism of stare decisis. Justice Thomas
has aptly been regarded as one of the Justices most willing to overturn
incorrect decisions,52 and has published many separate opinions call-
ing for the reconsideration of settled precedent.53 In Gamble Justice
Thomas explained that his long-standing practice of disregarding
precedent was not only legitimate, but sometimes obligatory.
47 Puerto Rico v Sanchez Valle, 136 S Ct 1863, 1877 (2016) (Ginsburg, J, concurring, joined
by Thomas, J); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Stuart Banner in Support of Petitioner,
Walker v Texas, No 16-636 (Dec 12, 2016).
48 Gamble, 139 S Ct at 1964.
49 Id at 1980 (Thomas, J, concurring).
50 Id at 1981.
51 Id.
52 Adam Liptak, Precedent, Meet Clarence Thomas. You May Not Get Along, New York Times
A13 (March 4, 2019).
53 For two of many examples, see Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 498, 538 (1998)
(Thomas, J, concurring) (calling for reconsideration of Calder v Bull, 3 Dall 386 (1798);
McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 US 742, 850–58 (2010) (Thomas, J, concurring in judgment)
(calling for overruling The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873) and United States v
Cruikshank, 92 US 542 (1876)).
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The steps in JusticeThomas’s argument are relatively simple: Legal
questions can have right and wrong answers. Statutes and constitu-
tional provisions are generally the controlling sources of law in federal
courts. Precedents themselves are not law. So to the extent that a
precedent reaches the demonstrably wrong answer about a statute or
constitutional provision, it is contrary to the law, and judges should
follow the law rather than the precedent.54
Justice Thomas acknowledged some academic precursors of this
argument, especially work by Professor Caleb Nelson.55 In particu-
lar, Nelson had forcefully emphasized the distinction between prece-
dents that were demonstrably erroneous and thus invalid, and other
precedents that fell within a plausible range of indeterminacy. But
Thomas’s variation of the theory brought an important difference: the
introduction of discretion.
In cases where a precedent was plausible—that is, it was not “de-
monstrably erroneous”—Justice Thomas maintained that a judge
had discretion. The judge could follow precedent, or not. “[W]hen
traditional tools of legal interpretation show that the earlier decision
adopted a textually permissible interpretation of the law,” then courts
“may ( but need not) adhere to an incorrect decision as precedent.”56
Justice Thomas repeatedly emphasized this point: “Of course, a
subsequent court may nonetheless conclude that an incorrect pre-
cedent should be abandoned, even if the precedent might fall within
the range of permissible interpretations. But nothing in the Consti-
tution requires courts to take that step.”57
In this respect Justice Thomas’s theory departs from the historical
approach to stare decisis described by Nelson. On Nelson’s account,
judicial discretion was more constrained. When the underlying writ-
ten law58 was clear, that law constrained judicial discretion. When
that law was indeterminate, and thus the precedent was plausible,
stare decisis would “restrain the ‘arbitrary discretion’ of courts” by
54 Gamble, 139 S Ct at 1983–84 (Thomas, J, concurring).
55 Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va L Rev 1 (2001).
See also Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 23,
26 (1994).
56 Gamble, 139 S Ct at 1984 (Thomas, J, concurring) (emphasis added).
57 Id at 1986.
58 Or in the case of the common law, the “external sources.” See Nelson, 87 Va L Rev at
23–27 (cited in note 55), for a complicated debate not important for constitutional purposes.
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requiring adherence to precedent.59 Justice Thomas abandoned that
requirement, without having the boldness to go further and argue that
stare decisis was always forbidden. Instead, Justice Thomas created a
space where stare decisis produced discretion instead of constraint.
This discretionary departure is especially ironic, because Justice
Thomas repeatedly justified his approach on the ground that it was
necessary to constrain judicial discretion. He noted that it was “al-
ways ‘tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the
requirements of the law,’” and that “the Court’s stare decisis doctrine
exacerbates that temptation by giving the veneer of respectability to
our continued application of demonstrably incorrect precedents.”60
He argued that we should “restore our stare decisis jurisprudence to
ensure that we exercise ‘mer[e] judgment,’ . . . anything less invites
arbitrariness into judging.”61
In fact, however, Justice Thomas was only halfway willing to “re-
store” this historical account of stare decisis. He proposed a manda-
tory, historical account of stare decisis for demonstrably erroneous
precedents, but a discretionary, novel account of stare decisis for
more ambiguous precedents. His approach was therefore only half-
way able to fulfill its goals of constraining arbitrariness and judicial
discretion.
Moreover, Justice Thomas’s approach tries to eliminate arbitrar-
iness, but such arbitrariness also creeps back in through other aspects
of the Court’s procedures. For instance, the vast majority of prec-
edents are never questioned by the parties. So it becomes very im-
portant to know how Justice Thomas’s rule of precedent interacts
with the traditional rule of waiver. Justice Thomas addressed this is-
sue in a footnote:
I am not suggesting that the Court must independently assure itself that
each precedent relied on in every opinion is correct as a matter of original
understanding. We may, consistent with our constitutional duty and the
Judiciary’s historical practice, proceed on the understanding that our pre-
decessors properly discharged their constitutional role until we have reason
59 Nelson, 87 Va L Rev at 5 (cited in note 55), quoting Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Clinton
Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 439 (1999).
60 Gamble, 139 S Ct at 1981 (Thomas, J, concurring), quoting Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct
2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, J, dissenting).
61 Gamble, 139 S Ct at 1981 (Thomas, J, concurring).
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to think otherwise—as, for example, when a party raises the issue or a
previous opinion persuasively critiques the disputed precedent.62
This answer, too, renders stare decisis more discretionary than would
application of an ordinary render waiver rule.
Rather than saying that a precedent will not be reconsidered if a
challenge to it is waived, Justice Thomas allows only that the Court
“may” decline to investigate the correctness of a precedent. There
is discretion. And rather than limit those who can challenge a pre-
cedent to the parties, Justice Thomas also allows prior opinions to do
so, and apparently other unnamed sources (“for example”). This
apparently creates discretion to decide when an amicus brief, an ac-
ademic article, or other source might circumvent the waiver rule.
Thus a Justice may, but need not, decline to investigate the validity of
a precedent that has gone unchallenged.
A final example of discretion and potential arbitrariness is created
by the Court’s own certiorari process. The Supreme Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction is largely discretionary, allowing the Court to de-
cide what cases, and what questions presented in those cases, it would
like to resolve. Since the parties are supposed to restrict themselves
to the questions presented,63 this means that the certiorari process can
filter out most attempts to revisit any of the Court’s precedents.64
This filtering ability is compounded by a Court-pronounced rule
of strong vertical precedent. Lower courts are never supposed to de-
clare the Supreme Court’s precedents overruled if the Court has not.
No matter how “wobbly” or “moth-eaten” the “foundations” of its
precedents, the Court has instructed, “it is this Court’s prerogative
alone to overrule one of its own precedents.”65 If this rule is fol-
lowed,66 then no circuit split emerges about the validity of a Supreme
62 Id at 1986 n 6.
63 US S Ct Rule 14.1(a); US S Ct Rule 24.1(a).
64 See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex L Rev 1711,
1731–33 (2013); Amy Coney Barrett and John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19
U Pa J Const L 1, 16–23 (2016); Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis and the Selection Effect, in
Christopher J. Peters, ed, Precedent in the United States Supreme Court 121 (Springer, 2012).
65 State Oil Co. v Khan, 522 US 3, 20 (1997). See also Bosse v Oklahoma, 137 S Ct 1, 2 (2016);
United States v Hatter, 532 US 557, 567 (2001); Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 237 (1997);
Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 US 477, 484 (1989).
66 To be sure, there have been important cases where it was not, such as the lower-court
cases leading up to the recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584
(2015), that concluded that the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance in Baker v Nelson, 409
US 810 (1972), was no longer controlling. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court
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Court precedent, and circuit splits are one of the primary reasons the
Court grants certiorari.67
This is how the same Justice who agreed that the Court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence should be revisited68 could nonetheless ap-
ply it unblinkingly in subsequent cases.69 The duty to disregard de-
monstrably erroneous precedents is a lot less powerful if it applies
only to precedents that the Justices have chosen to reconsider when
exercising their discretion to vote for certiorari. As Judge AmyConey
Barrett and Professor John Nagle have put it: “Institutional features
of Supreme Court practice permit all Justices to let some sleeping
dogs lie, and so far as we are aware, no one has ever argued that a
Justice is duty-bound to wake them up.”70
III. Justice Alito and Halfway Originalism
While Justice Alito has also described himself as an original-
ist, his constitutional approach is noticeably distinct from Justice
Thomas’s.71 So too, his theory of stare decisis. An interesting illus-
tration of this difference came in Justice Alito’s short concurring
opinion in Gundy.
Gundy was a challenge to a federal statute as violating the non-
delegation doctrine. Such challenges are rarely successful, but Gundy
concerned a criminal statute—the Sex Offender Registration Noti-
fication Act—so there were at least three possible arguments for the
challenger to win. One was to convince the Court that the statute
lacked an “intelligible principle” and violated the current version
of the nondelegation doctrine. A second was to convince the Court
Precedent from Below, 104 Georgetown L J 921, 968–71 (2016); Emily Buss, The Divisive
Supreme Court, 2016 Supreme Court Review 25, 35–64 (2016). Some of those cases specif-
ically relied on the fact that Baker v Nelson was a summary affirmance, and arguably subject to
a less strong rule of vertical precedent. See Bostic v Schaefer, 760 F3d 352, 373 (4th Cir 2014);
see also Re, 104 Georgetown L J at 968 n 235 (cited in this note).
67 US S Ct Rule 10; Barrett, 91 Tex L Rev at 1730 (cited in note 64).
68 Ziglar v Abbasi, 137 S Ct 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J, concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
69 See, for example, District of Columbia v Wesby, 138 S Ct 577, 589–93 (2018) (Thomas, J).
70 See Barrett and Nagle, 19 U Pa J Const L at 20 (cited in note 64).
71 See Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, American Spectator (Apr 21, 2014),
archived at https://perma.cc/XD92-CVGH (“I think I would consider myself a practical
originalist.”). See also Steven G. Calabresi and Todd W. Shaw, The Jurisprudence of Justice
Samuel Alito, 87 Geo Wash L Rev 507, 512 (2019) (concluding that a “theme of Justice Alito’s
jurisprudence is originalism, though not in the traditional sense of the word that one might
associate with Justice Scalia”).
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that a more exacting version of the nondelegation doctrine should
be revived. A third was to convince the Court that a more exacting
standard should apply in criminal cases, thus making it easier for
Gundy to win without threatening the administrative state. Gundy
likely hoped to assemble a coalition of votes from among these dif-
ferent theories.
But Gundy did not prevail. A plurality of the Court concluded that
the statute contained an intelligible principle and should be upheld
under current doctrine.72 A three-Justice dissent concluded that a
more exacting test should be revived, and that the statute would fail.73
And Justice Alito wrote separately, providing the fifth vote to the
majority outcome74 for his own reasons:
The Constitution confers on Congress certain “legislative [p]owers,”
Art. I, § 1, and does not permit Congress to delegate them to another
branch of the Government. SeeWhitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). Nevertheless, since 1935, the Court has uni-
formly rejected nondelegation arguments and has upheld provisions that
authorized agencies to adopt important rules pursuant to extraordinarily
capacious standards. See ibid.
If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a
majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the
provision at issue here for special treatment.
Because I cannot say that the statute lacks a discernable standard that is
adequate under the approach this Court has taken for many years, I vote to
affirm.75
Justice Alito’s approach stands inmarked contrast to Justice Thomas’s.
Justice Alito appeared to maintain that the Court’s nondelegation
doctrine was erroneous because it permitted excessive delegation to
the executive branch, but he nonetheless chose to follow it in Gundy
because “it would be freakish” to grant relief to sex offenders without
also granting it to other regulated parties.
While uncharitable readers might be tempted to see this as an
overtly political or results-oriented opinion, Justice Alito in fact
72 Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2121.
73 Id at 2139–44 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
74 Because Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision of the case, Justice Alito’s
fifth vote was necessary to the publication of the opinions, but not the judgment. Without it,
the Court would have affirmed, without opinion, by an equally divided Court.
75 Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2130–31 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment).
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shrewdly identifies a profound problem of constitutional theory. The
underlying problem is the problem of constitutional law and the
second best. It is not unique to originalism, but it may be especially
easy to see for originalists. Suppose the Constitution requires one
thing and doctrine requires something different. And suppose that
for whatever reason—lack of votes, reliance interests, or something
else—the erroneous doctrine is not going to be completely overruled.
What should a judge do? Adhere to the Constitution wherever pos-
sible, thus minimizing the scope of the doctrine? Adhere to the doc-
trine until it is overruled? There is a particular dilemma in cases at
the border of the doctrine. Extend the doctrine, and you extend the
error. Reject the doctrine, and you create a sharp—and perhaps un-
justified—difference in two similar types of cases.
Moreover, any approach that sometimes involves considering doc-
trine will also give rise to the possibility of “compensating adjust-
ments.”76 That is, once doctrine has replaced the otherwise-correct
constitutional answer in one area, it is no longer clear what to do in
related areas.Themost famous example is the argument thatwe ought
to compensate for the unconstitutional expansion of delegated power
to agencies by upholding the otherwise unconstitutional legislative
veto.77 One unconstitutional act sort of makes up for the other.
Professor Adrian Vermeule, who has written the most systematic
treatment of this problem to date, has concluded that both “the am-
bitious idea that judges should evaluate global consequences on a
case-by-case basis” and the opposite “case-by-case procedure” are
suspect on second-best grounds.78 Most other scholars have grappled
with this problem only in the context of individual compensating
adjustments to particular doctrines.79 Perhaps, like The General The-
ory of the Second Best in economics, it has no general solution.80
76 Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U Chi L Rev 421, 421 (2003).
77 Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a
Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L Rev 1, 23–40 (1994); INS v Chadha, 462
US 919, 978 (1983) (White, J, dissenting). See also Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects
and the Constitution, 123 Harv L Rev 4, 20–23 (2009) (listing this and many other examples).
78 Vermeule, 70 U Chi L Rev at 436–37 (cited in note 76); see also Vermeule, 123 Harv L
Rev at 62–63 (cited in note 77).
79 Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 Mich L
Rev 1405, 1442–48 (2019) (official immunity); McCutchen, 80 Cornell L Rev 1 (cited in note
77) (separation of powers and legislative veto). John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport,
Originalism and the Good Constitution 94–97 (Harvard, 2013) (expressing skepticism of com-
pensating adjustments by judges).
80 See generally R. G. Lipsey and Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24
Rev Econ Stud 11 (1956).
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In any event, Justice Alito’s opinion inGundy effectively rejects the
simpleminded approach to second-best problems of simply trying to
get each case, individually, as close as possible to the correct doctrine.
It treats correct constitutional doctrine as something that should be
pursued somewhat systematically or not at all.
This is consistent with his opinion the previous year in Janus. In
Janus the Supreme Court held that it violated the First Amendment
to force public employees to give a portion of their paycheck to a
public sector union. One of the arguments made by the union in its
defensewas an originalist one: as an originalmatter, public employees
did not have any First Amendment rights, and so First Amendment
doctrine should not be extended to give them a new right against com-
pelled subsidies.
Justice Alito, in his opinion for the Court, responded that taking
this originalist argument seriously “would mean overturning decades
of landmark precedent,” and accused the union of “desiring instead
that we apply the Constitution’s supposed originalmeaning only when
it suits them—to retain the part of Abood that they like. We will not
engage in this halfway originalism.”81 On its face this was a strange
accusation, since the majority itself went on to “retain the part of
Abood that they like[d],” but the upshot was clear enough: Justice Alito
may call himself an originalist, but he did not want to call himself a
chump.
Some federal appellate judges have also begun to endorse Jus-
tice Alito’s skepticism of halfway originalism. In the Eleventh Circuit,
litigants asked the en banc court to narrow the scope of Terry v Ohio,
which authorized frisks without obvious originalist analysis.82 Judge
William Pryor wrote the opinion refusing this request, noting that
the well-established exclusionary rule also lacked an originalist basis,
and concluding: “[W]e cannot use a halfway theory of judicial pre-
cedent to cut back on Terry while faithfully adhering to the exclu-
sionary rule.”83
In the Fifth Circuit, the same thing happened in the qualified im-
munity context. Responding to various criticisms (including by this
81 Janus, 138 S Ct at 2469–70 (citation omitted). The Court also went on to dispute the
originalist argument on its own terms. Id.
82 United States v Johnson, 921 F3d 991, 1009–11 (11th Cir 2019) (Jordan, J, dissenting),
discussing Minnesota v Dickerson, 508, 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J, concurring) and other
originalist critiques of Terry.
83 Johnson, 921 F3d at 1002 (en banc).
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author) that the doctrine lacked a lawful foundation, Judges James
Ho and Andrew Oldham authored a joint dissent invoking the no-
halfway-originalism principle. Even if qualified immunity lacked a
lawful basis, they wrote, “a principled originalist would not cherry
pick which rules to revisit based on popular whim. A principled
originalist would fairly review decisions that favor plaintiffs as well as
police officers.”84 Hence, the judges asked rhetorically: “Does the
majority seriously believe that it is an ‘unreasonable seizure,’ as those
words were originally understood at the Founding, for a police officer to
stop an armed and mentally unstable teenager from shooting inno-
cent officers, students, and teachers?”85 No, they declared: “If we’re
not going to do it right, then perhaps we shouldn’t do it at all.”86
In both cases, the lower-court judges could also reasonably note
that they were simply bound to apply Supreme Court precedent re-
gardless of whether it was right or wrong.87 But they did not stop
there, apparently to signal their special skepticism of halfway orig-
inalism. Justice Alito is thus hardly a lone voice.
But this call for “principled” rather than “halfway” originalism has
problems. The first is that even its proponents do not adhere to it
consistently. Consider another example from last Term, the cert pe-
tition inHester v United States,88 where the Court was asked to extend
its jury-trial precedents to an order of restitution. Justices Gorsuch
and Sotomayor wrote in support of the petition.89 But Justice Alito
wrote to explain his vote against:
The argument that the Sixth Amendment, as originally understood, re-
quires a jury to find the facts supporting an order of restitution depends
upon the proposition that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the
facts on which a sentence of imprisonment is based. That latter proposition
is supported by decisions of this Court, seeUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 230–232 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000), but
84 Cole v Carson, 935 F3d 444, 477 (5th Cir 2019) (Ho and Oldham dissenting).
85 Id at 478 (Ho and Oldham dissenting).
86 Id. In a subsequent opinion, Judge Ho again voiced these concerns, and clarified that this
was not a justification for retaining qualified immunity doctrine in its current form. Horvath v
City of Leander, 2020 WL 104345, at ∗13 (5th Cir) (Ho concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (“We can walk and chew gum at the same time. Courts can faithfully
interpret the Fourth Amendment as well as § 1983. We can get both prongs of the doctrine
right.”).
87 Johnson, 921 F3d at 1002; Cole, 935 F3d at 477.
88 139 S Ct 509 (2019).
89 Id at 509–11 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J).
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it represents a questionable interpretation of the original meaning of the
Sixth Amendment, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 64–66 (2007) (Alito,
J., dissenting). Unless the Court is willing to reconsider that interpreta-
tion, fidelity to originalmeaning counsels against further extension of these
suspect precedents.90
The principle that “fidelity to original meaning counsels against
further extension of . . . suspect precedents” may sound reasonable,
and it is. But it is the opposite of Justice Alito’s injunctions against
halfway originalism. The very same argument could have been made
of the requests in Gundy and Janus: We should not extend our “suspect
precedents” permitting delegation to SORNA, Justice Alito might have
said. We should not extend our “suspect precedents” on compelled spending
by public employees to eliminate agency fees, Justice Alito might have
said. One Justice’s “halfway originalism” is another Justice’s limiting
“suspect precedents.” Actually, the same Justice’s.
This is not meant to score a cheap point in a game of “jurispru-
dential gotcha,”91 but rather to demonstrate a broader problem with
second-best originalism. The problem is that there is no general so-
lution to the existence of a suspect precedent. It is plausible to say that
the precedent should not be extended, because it is suspect. It is
plausible to instead say that the precedent should be treated fairly
unless and until it is overruled. But if the judge retains discretion to
choose either plausible course, then each suspect precedent gives the
judge an additional degree of discretion.
Say what you will about the simpleminded approach, but at least it
bound the judge. Until there is a general solution to the second-best
problem in constitutional law, invoking the problem gives a judge
broad discretion to adhere to erroneous—even demonstrably erro-
neous—precedent.
IV. The Problem with Discretion
These new opinions exploring precedent, while theoretically
rich, have exacerbated one of the doctrine’s unfortunate features in
the SupremeCourt—its discretionary nature. This discretion has two
aspects. One is the elimination of constraints on the judge’s choice
90 Id at 509 (Alito, J, concurring).
91 Justin Driver, Judicial Inconsistency as Virtue: The Case of Justice Stevens, 99 Georgetown L
J 1263, 1265 n 7 (2011).
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whether to adhere to a precedent or not. Not only do these ap-
proaches lack the hard-edged constraints of a rule, but they do not
even provide the softer constraint of a guiding standard. They do not
contain an internal constraint even for “the puzzled judge” who
“would like to be able to apply the law without importing nonlegal
considerations.”92 The second aspect is that this discretion is not
bounded by or derived from law. Taken together, these discretionary
features render precedent worse than useless. They make it a tool for
evading other requirements of the law, and a threat to certain aspects
of judicial neutrality.
Professor Schauer argued in this journal that stare decisis does little
to constrain the Justices’ decisions, and that thismay not be such a bad
thing. “[T]he weakness, verging on impotence, of the widely refer-
enced but rarely followed stare decisis norm”may be evidence that we
do not actually want or need the stability or authority that the norm
promises.93
My analysis is less optimistic. It may be true that stare decisis does
little to constrain the Justices, for all of the reasons recounted by
Schauer andmany others. But stare decisis does something else, which
is to allow them to escape other constraints that might be imposed by
law or interpretive methodology. A discretionary doctrine of prece-
dent is not just impotent, but corrosive.
How is it corrosive? For one thing, it is inconsistent with one of the
central tenets of judicial review, a tenet that traces all the way back to
Chief JusticeMarshall’s opinion inMarbury vMadison.94 InMarbury,
the Court had to justify its decision to review legislation duly enacted
by Congress. It also had to explain how it could do so without taking
on a legislative role, rather than its proscribed judicial role. It did so
by emphasizing that judicial review was a duty, not a choice. It was
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”95 When the Constitution and a statute conflict, “the
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”96
92 See William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U Chi L Rev 2213, 2223–24
(2017).
93 Schauer, 2018 Supreme Court Review at 142–43 (cited in note 1).
94 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
95 Id at 177.
96 Id at 178.
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If judicial review is a duty, not a choice, then that relieves the
Court of a burden of justification. The Court does not need to make
its own judgment about which rule is preferable if its choice is forced.
This basic account of judicial review is central to a classical concep-
tion of the judiciary, one especially revered by formalists, in which the
court’s job is to simply apply the law in cases that come before it.97
To be sure, the true picture is more complicated than a quote from
Marbury. The law itself may consist of principles or standards rather
than rules.98 The law itself may confer judicial discretion.99 So the
duty to follow the lawmay require judges tomake difficult judgments,
and even choices. But these judgments and choices are less of a threat
to the law precisely because they are given by, and therefore con-
trolled by, law. This marks the difference between “arbitrary dis-
cretion” and “mere legal discretion” that was central to antebellum
debates about stare decisis.100
To see this distinction, consider why it was plausible for now-
Justice Kavanaugh to argue that stare decisis is required by Article III.
Article III permits judges to exercise only “judicial” power. If exces-
sive discretion could render judicial activity nonjudicial, and if stare
decisis can hem in this discretion, then the doctrine helps to ensure
that judges exercise only judicial power.101 Hence, now-Justice Kava-
naugh invoked Federalist No. 78, where Alexander Hamilton wrote:
“[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them.”102 But this structural argument works only if
precedent supplements judicial duty rather than undermining it.
The new approaches to precedent come closer to “arbitrary dis-
cretion” than “legal discretion.” For judges with otherwise formalist
commitments, these approaches function to switch off the formalist
97 See, for example, Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (Harvard, 2008).
98 See Justin Driver, Rules, the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Man-
ageability After Vieth v. Jubelirer, 73 Geo Wash L Rev 1166, 1182–85 (2005).
99 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 NYU L Rev 543 (1985).
100 Nelson, 87 Va L Rev at 9–10 (cited in note 55).
101 The alternative is that these limits come from written or external sources of law. Id at 9–
21, 22–27.
102 Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist Papers 529 (1961);
Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing at 149, 226, 257 (cited in note 6).
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mode. Rather than follow a formalist argument to a politically unpal-
atable conclusion, a Justice can choose to invoke second-best prin-
ciples in some cases but not others. Rather than being bound by either
precedent or text in cases of ambiguity, a Justice can choose which one
to follow, and therefore be bound by neither. Precedent thus operates
to negate the legal restrictions on judicial discretion. What good is a
doctrine of precedent if it serves to increase judicial discretion rather
than to decrease it?103
This kind of arbitrary, nonlegal discretion not only permits a judge
to indulge nonlegal considerations, butmakes it hard for him to avoid
it. A legal duty provides some justification for judicial actions that
would otherwise be morally suspect.Whymay a judge sometimes or-
der the seizure of property, the restraint of liberty, or tolerate bad
governmental or private behavior? Because the law says so, and the
judge has some duty to apply the law.104 But once the judge has a
choice, he no longer has that excuse.
In other words, once the keys to stare decisis are in the judges’
own hands, neither precedent nor nonprecedent can provide an an-
swer to moral dilemmas or to political pressure. Consider the most
salient precedent in the country, Roe v Wade.105 In response to grow-
ing calls to overrule the controversial decision, the Supreme Court
famously relied on precedent to reaffirm its core holding in Planned
Parenthood v Casey.106 But the Court did not succeed at its goal of
“call[ing] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution.”107 The future of the decision remains unsettled.
The same dilemma confronts the current Justices, some of whom
may well both believe that Roe was wrongly decided, but prefer to
narrow it or ignore it rather than overruling it. It is only a matter of
time before they are put to the test, and when they do so they may be
103 But see Richard M. Re, Precedent as Permission ∗1 (unpublished article, Nov 11, 2019)
(“This essay provides an account of precedent that does not call upon it to do the one thing
that everyone expects: constrain judicial decision-making. Instead, precedent is tasked to do
something else: identify lawful options. So instead of beginning with precedent’s limited
ability to constrain, the argument focuses first on what precedent enables.”).
104 On the defeasibility of this duty, see William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115
Colum L Rev 2349, 2395–97 (2015).
105 410 US 113 (1973).
106 505 US at 854–69 (1992).
107 Id at 867.
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unable to insist either that they were required to overrule it, or that
they were forbidden to do so. In the absence of either a clear rule or a
legally-sourced standard, the choice whether to followRoe or overrule
it will be “arbitrary discretion” in Hamilton’s sense. This is precisely
the vice that formalist judging is supposed to forswear.
To be sure, discretionary stare decisis is more of a problem for
somemethods of judging than for others. Some legal theories already
assume a great deal of discretion on behalf of the judges. For judges
operating under those theories, the additional discretion granted by
stare decisis may be nothing new. But Justices Alito and Thomas, like
other members of the Court, profess to be originalists, and orig-
inalism professes to give judges a source of law outside their own
will.108 Discretionary precedent—neither forbidden nor required—
forfeits that justification for originalism.
V. Conclusion
The quest for principled judging is in large part a quest for
neutral principles.109 Both originalism and stare decisis derive their
enduring popularity from their potential neutrality. And, indeed, at
their best they live up to this promise. Originalism can be a neutral
principle.110 Absolute stare decisis is a neutral principle.
There are also some potentially principled approaches for mixing
the two, such as a rule that stare decisis controls in cases of indeter-
minacy and originalism controls in cases of clarity.111 Or a rule that
follows the original understanding of “liquidation,” which required
indeterminacy, deliberate practice, and settlement—a solution I have
suggested elsewhere.112 Perhaps even a variation on more modern
stare decisis doctrine could accomplish this. But if a Justice or a court
does not adopt a neutral principle for mixing the two, adopting two
neutral principles at the same time is worse than adopting none.
108 See Baude, 84 U Chi L Rev at 2223–29 (cited in note 92).
109 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1
(1959); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1
(1971).
110 Baude, 84 U Chi L Rev at 2223–29 (cited in note 92).
111 See Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand L Rev 105
(2015); Nelson, 87 Va L Rev 1 (cited in note 55). This assumes that clarity is itself a neutral
principle, see Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U Chi L Rev 1497 (2019); Ryan D.
Doerfler, Going Clear (Aug 1, 2019), online at https://ssrn.com/abstractp3326550.
112 William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan L Rev 1, 42–44 (2019).
7] PRECEDENT AND DISCRETION 333
The problem of the second best in constitutional law is a harder
one, and deserves the same attention that has been given to the topic
of stare decisis itself. Without reaching a general solution, however,
we can still say it is better to adopt a consistent stance to this problem
than an opportunistic one. If a suspect precedent is not revisited,
there is a question whether to extend it or to limit it. But a Justice
should not pick and choose different approaches for equally suspect
precedents.
Modern stare decisis doctrine now does the very opposite of what
the doctrine was once supposed to do. It introduces elements of the
arbitrary discretion it was once meant to constrain. So while many
reports in the coming years will likely assert that the Roberts Court
has rendered stare decisis nothing but a pretense, I fear that the truth
is actually much worse.
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